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CONFUCIUS AND THE CHINESE LEGAL 
TRADITION 
Chenglin Liu* 
More than two thousand years ago, Confucius transformed and 
perfected an institution for governing Chinese people, which has been 
religiously replicated by subsequent dynasties. Within the Confucian 
institution, the King, at the pinnacle of the pyramid, held absolute 
authority; regional lords were loyal to the King; and commoners were 
submissive to the privileged. Confucius held that peace and order could 
only be achieved when people acted according to their hierarchical worth 
assigned by the ruler. This article offers an overview of the 
transformation of Confucianism. It then examines competing schools of 
thought—Legalism and Taoism—and explains why Confucianism 
triumphed to become the official Chinese ideology. Through a series of 
case studies, the article theorizes that the central theme of Confucian-
inspired laws was perpetuation of inequality. With the declining 
influence of Marxism, the Communist Party has revived the Confucian 
tradition to maintain its legitimacy and project its “soft power” to the 
world. This article concludes that, against the massive weight of tradition 
deeply ingrained in the people’s minds and souls, the rule of law and 
equality will unlikely be an important force in China.  
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478 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 479 
2. THE DYNASTIC CYCLE .......................................................................... 484 
3. THE ZHOU DYNASTY ............................................................................. 485 
a. The Origin of the Zhou Dynasty .................................................. 486 
b. Mandate of Heaven ...................................................................... 487 
c. Enfeoffment ................................................................................. 489 
d. The Fall of the Feudal Order and Confucius’s Ideals .................. 490 
4. THE LIFE OF CONFUCIUS ....................................................................... 493 
a. The Case of Shaozheng Mao ....................................................... 497 
b. Confucius : The Eternal Patriarch ................................................ 500 
5. LET A HUNDRED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONTEND ............................. 502 
a. Confucianism ............................................................................... 502 
b. Legalism ...................................................................................... 505 
c. Burning Books and Burying Scholars Alive ............................... 509 
d. Taoism as Transition ................................................................... 512 
e. Confucianism as the Official Ideology ........................................ 515 
6. THE CORE VALUE OF CONFUCIANISM: INEQUALITY ............................. 515 
7. THE CONFUCIANIZATION OF LAW ......................................................... 517 
a. Family Relations and Criminal Penalties .................................... 519 
b. The Case of Jao (Mother Ordered Son to Purchase Poison for 
Her Suicide.) ................................................................................ 522 
c. The Case of Chen née Chang (Married Daughter’s Obligation to 
Her Parents) ................................................................................. 523 
d. The Case of Chen (Daughter-In-Law’s Obligation to Her Father-
In-Law) ........................................................................................ 525 
e. The Case of Hsing Hai (An Official’s Immunity After Killing 
His Son) ....................................................................................... 525 
f. A Sense of Proportionality........................................................... 527 
8. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ............................................................... 528 
a. Lawyers as Litigation Tricksters ................................................. 529 
b. Death Penalty ............................................................................... 531 
9. CONCLUSION: THE APPLE DOESN’T FALL FAR FROM THE TREE. ......... 532 
 
 
2020] Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition 479 
1. INTRODUCTION  
When Mao Zedong established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in 1949, he solemnly declared that the new nation was no longer saddled 
with the “three mountains”—feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucrat-
capitalism.1  By embracing Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology, 
the new nation severed ties with the traditional cultures and institutions, 
which had lasted for thousands of years.2  Mao poetically described the 
new nation as a clean canvas on which he would “compose the most 
elegant lyrics and draw the most beautiful pictures.”3  As a pragmatist, 
Mao not only offered an inspiring image of the future but also made it 
clear that the Confucian tradition would never return to compete with 
Communism.4 
The mass campaigns for the destruction and elimination of the 
Chinese tradition began at the inception of the new republic and reached 
its climax during the Cultural Revolution.5  One of the objectives of the 
Cultural Revolution “was to wipe out the ‘four olds’—old customs, old 
culture, old habits, and old ideas.”6  The most violent act took place at 
Qufu, where the Red Guards desecrated Confucius’s tomb, destroyed his 
temples, and dismembered his statues.7  They also defaced and smashed 
numerous stone carvings inscribed with calligraphy by emperors and 
  
 1. Chinese People are Marching Towards Bright Future, 43 PEKING REV. 24, 25 
(1968), https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1968/PR1968-43l.htm.  
 2. See Tillman Durdin, China Transformed by Elimination of ‘Four Olds’, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 19, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/19/archives/china-
transformed-by-elimination-of-four-olds.html (discussing the origins of the “Cultural 
Revolution in China”).  
 3. MAO ZEDONG (毛泽东), JIESHAO YIGE HEZOU (介绍一个合作社) 
[INTRODUCING A CO-OPERATIVE], 2 (1975).  
 4. See generally A. James Gregor & Maria Hsia Chang, Anti-Confucianism: 
Mao’s Last Campaign, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 1073 (1979).  
 5. Durdin, supra note 2.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Zhang Shunqing (张顺清), Tan Houlan Qufu “Taokong” Jishi (谭厚兰曲阜
”讨孔”纪实) [A Factual Record of How Tan Houlan Laid Siege to Qufu], YANHUANG 
CHUNQIU, 2015, at 19, 19. See also Zhang Shunqing (张顺清), The Documentary of Tan 
Houlan’s Qufu “Discussion Hole”, http://www.yhcqw.com/34/9756.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2020).  
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scholars from various dynasties praising Confucius.8  Residents looted 
Confucius’s temples and tombs for artifacts and archives.9  The most 
culturally insulting transgression perpetrated by the Red Guards occurred 
when they publicly exhumed and mutilated the body of Confucius’s 76th 
generation descendant.10  By resorting to these extreme measures, the 
Red Guards hoped to eradicate Confucius’s influence once and for all.11  
However, uprooting a tradition deeply ingrained in the people’s minds 
and souls for thousands of years was not as simple as Mao believed.12  
From generation to generation, people subconsciously carried on the 
Confucian tradition.13  With the passing of the old generation of leaders 
and the declining influence of Communism, Chinese political leadership 
has recently made a deliberate effort to revive the Confucian tradition in 
hopes of solidifying public support for the government and maintaining 
its legitimacy.14  The leadership has also openly embraced the Confucian 
spirit in an attempt to solve the thorny social issues caused by rapid 
economic expansion.15  There is no clearer official endorsement of the 
Chinese tradition than President Xi’s signature agenda, which calls for 
building “a Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.”16  
  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Liu Yanxun, Kongzi My Mengnan Ji [How Confucius’s Tomb Was 
Destroyed], ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN [CHINA NEWSWEEK], Mar. 15, 2010, at 80, 80. 
 11. Sang Ye & Geremie R. Barmé, Commemorating Confucius in 1966-67: The 
Fate of the Confucius Temple, the Kong Mansion, and Kong Cemetery, CHINESE 
HERITAGE (Dec. 2009), 
http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?searchterm=020_confucius.inc&i
ssue=020. 
 12. See Evan Osnos, Confucius Comes Home: Move Over, Mao, NEW YORKER 
(Jan. 5, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/13/confucius-comes-
home. 
 13. See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD 273 (2009) 
(“Whatever democratic political system evolves in China will bear the heavy imprint of 
its Confucian past.”). 
 14. See Jeremy Page, Why China is Turning Back to Confucius, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 20, 2015, 9:00 AM EDT), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-china-is-turning-
back-to-confucius-1442754000. 
 15. Id. (“Mao doesn’t sell. Communism doesn’t sell. But Confucianism and other 
traditional thinking can make sense.”). 
 16. See Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Report 
at the 19th CPC National Congress (Oct. 18, 2017).  
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It took fifty years for Chinese authorities to reverse course—from 
digging up Confucius’s tombs to promoting Confucius both at home and 
abroad.17 The half-century anti-Confucius detour was only a brief hiatus 
in a two-thousand-year-old tradition.  While the “Confucius” that the 
Chinese government identifies with may not be the “Confucius” of the 
past, it is a winning strategy for the government to project its “soft 
power” through Confucius’s enduring legacy and publicity, especially on 
the world stage.18  The government has established more than 500 
Confucius Institutes all over the world, some of which are on American 
university campuses.19  So far, the government has enlisted “Confucius” 
as an agent for both marketing socialist values internationally and 
rekindling nationalism at home.20  
Confucianism is a multifaceted institution that does not lend itself to a 
clear definition.  Historically, Confucianism advocated benevolent 
governance but also held that a harmonious society could only be 
achieved when people acted according to their hierarchical worth 
assigned by the patriarch.21 It required absolute submission from the 
inferior to the superior.22  Confucianism promoted learning, but limited 
study to the classics edited by Confucius.23  It encouraged self-cultivation 
and self-fulfillment, but one needed to keep one’s thoughts within the 
realm of Confucian teachings.24  The official creed could not be 
  
 17. See ANNPING CHIN, THE AUTHENTIC CONFUCIUS: A LIFE OF THOUGHT AND 
POLITICS 11–12 (2007) (discussing the slow reintegration of Confucianism in the culture). 
 18. James F. Paradise, China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius 
Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power, 49 ASIAN SURVEY 647, 648 (2009).  
 19. The Confucius Institute, U. NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, 
https://confuciusinstitute.unl.edu/about-us-0 (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
 20. See Eleanor Albert, China’s Big Bet on Soft Power, COUNCILS ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power. See 
also Nicholas J.S. Miller, Pragmatic Nationalism and Confucianism: The New Ideology 
of the CCP, 2 INQUIRIES 1, 23, 32–36, 38 (2010), 
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/229/pragmatic-nationalism-and-confucianism-
the-new-ideology-of-the-ccp.  
 21. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 167–69.  
 22. See T’UNG-TSU CH’Ü, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 239 (1965).  
 23. Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy 191 (1948) (stating 
that Tung Chung-Shu was “instrumental in making Confucianism the orthodox belief of 
the Han Dynasty, at the expense of other schools of thought.”). 
 24. Id. at 191–92.   
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challenged in any way.25  Throughout history, intellectuals who 
attempted to deviate from the orthodox teachings and experiment with 
free-thinking, even inadvertently, faced jail terms or the death penalty.26  
Circumventing official censorship was a grave crime punishable by 
death.27  The Confucian tradition attached great importance to family 
values and responsibilities, but it often imposed unbearable burdens on 
family members.28  If a person committed one of the abominable crimes, 
such as treason or blasphemy, his relatives within nine degrees faced 
extermination by the death penalty or exile.29  
Confucian values are manifested in various aspects of current Chinese 
law.30  For example, according to a new provision recently added to the 
Elderly Protection Law (EPL), failure to visit one’s parents is illegal.31  
The law also obligates companies to grant leaves of absence for 
employees to visit their aging parents to fulfill their legal duties.32  As 
natural caretakers of their elderly parents, adult children are required to 
provide adequate physical and mental assistance to their parents.33  
Children cannot avoid their legal duty to care for their parents by 
  
 25. See generally GUO CHENGKANG (郭成康) & LIN TIEJUN (林铁钧), QINGCHAO 
WENZIYU (清朝文字狱) [THE LITERARY INQUISITION IN THE QING DYNASTY] 3, 7–8 
(1990). 
 26. Id.  
 27. CHIN, supra note 17, at 158. 
 28. SIMA QIAN (司马迁), SHIJI (史记) [HISTORICAL RECORD] 139 (1959). The 
following account is mainly based on Sima Qian’s work supplemented by modern 
biographers’ findings. This article cites the version by SIMA QIAN (司马迁), SHIJI (史记) 
[HISTORICAL RECORD] (Tian Wen (文天) trans. 2016) [hereinafter Wen]. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See generally Du Yimei, Rujia Sixiang Dui Dangdai Zhonggua Fazhi 
Wenhua de Yingxiang [Confucian Influence on Modern Chinese Law], TAIYUAN 
CHENGSHI ZHIYE JISHU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF TAIYUAN URB. VOCATIONAL C.] 2011. 
See also Cheng Jishan (程计山), “Xiaodao:” Xuyao Falv Lai Baohu? (“孝道”：需要法
律来保护?) [Filial Piety: In Need of the Protection of Law?], INST. OF L., 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=9381 (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). 
 31. Laonian Ren Quanyi Baozhang Fa (老年人权益保障法) [Law on Protection 
of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2018, effective Dec. 29, 2018), art. 18, 2019 STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 167 (China).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. art. 14.  
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relinquishing their inheritance.34  Under Chinese estate law, children who 
have failed to care for their parents have no right to receive a share of 
their parents’ estates.35  Those who have lived with and cared for their 
parents receive a larger share of the estates than those who have not 
fulfilled their familial duties.36  
The Chinese government often utilizes family collective 
responsibility, a hallmark of traditional law, to achieve its particular 
goals.  During the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, thousands of 
schoolchildren died because poorly constructed school buildings 
collapsed.37
 
  A group of parents planned to protest the government for its 
failure to hold the developers of the shoddy buildings accountable.38  
Fearing that a full investigation could reveal official corruption and cause 
social unrest, the government directed the local police to apprehend the 
leader of the planned protest.39  To maximize the pressure on the fleeing 
leader, the police arrested his relatives along with his eight-year-old 
son.40  Similarly, the government recently detained two American 
citizens, Victor and Cynthia Liu, who were visiting their ailing 
grandparents in China.41  The government defended the action by 
claiming that the two siblings’ father was a fugitive living in the United 
States.42  By detaining his children, the government intended to force the 
father to return to China to face an ongoing criminal investigation.  There 
  
 34. Id. art. 19.  
 35. Jicheng Fa (继承法) [Law of Succession], (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 10, 1984, effective Oct. 1, 1985), art. 13, 1985 FAGUI HUIBIAN 18 
(China). 
 36. Id.  
 37. See Chenglin Liu, Socialized Liability in Chinese Tort Law, 59 HARVARD 
INT’L L. J. 16, 40–41 (2018), https://harvardilj.org/2018/03/understanding-socialized-
liability-under-chinese-tort-law/.  
 38. See id. at 42.  
 39. See id.  
 40. See id.  
 41. Jennifer Hansler, Young American Held in China Makes Plea to Come Home, 
CNN (May 9, 2019, 3:35 PM EDT), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/09/politics/cynthia-
liu-plea/index.html.  
 42. Id.  
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is no evidence that the two children were involved in their father’s 
alleged crime.43   
This Article first offers an overview of both the Zhou Dynasty—
during which Confucius lived—and the transformation of Confucianism.  
Then it examines competing schools of thought, Legalism and Taoism, 
and explains why Confucianism triumphed to become official Chinese 
ideology.  It subsequently explores the influence of Confucianism on the 
legal tradition.  Confucius did not think the law was an indispensable 
institution, rather merely a last resort when moral teachings failed.44  
Rulers of later dynasties codified Confucius’s teaching into law, which 
included the death penalty for violation of the Confucian norms.45  
Through a series of case studies, this Article provides a detailed analysis 
of family relations and inequality before the law—two key concepts of 
Confucianism, which heavily influenced the Chinese legal tradition.  
This Article concludes with an assessment of Confucius’s life and his 
legacy, many aspects of which endure today.  
2. THE DYNASTIC CYCLE 
About 4,000 years ago, China began its civilization,46 producing “the 
longest and the most continuous historical record[s] of any existing 
nation.”47  These records show a clear pattern of dynastic cycles that 
punctuated Chinese history.48  Despite the sacrifices that accompanied 
  
 43. See Edward Wong & Michael Forsythe, China’s Tactic to Catch a Fugitive 
Official: Hold His Two American Children, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/us/politics/china-exit-ban.html. 
 44. See JAMES LEGGE, THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF CONFUCIUS WITH 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 122 (1867) [hereinafter CONFUCIUS ANALECTS]. 
 45. See infra p. 45.   
 46. Milton W. Meyer, China: A Concise History 23 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that 
Xia, the first Chinese dynasty, ruled either from 22501-1766 B.C. or 1994-1523 B.C.). 
See also WANG HANCHANG & LIN DAIZHAO, ZHONGGUO GUDAI ZHENGZHI ZHIDU SHILUE 
[A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF ANCIENT CHINA] 1 (1985) (citing Mao 
Zedong that the Chinese history dated back to 4,000 years ago.).    
 47. Walter T. Swingle, Chinese Historical Sources, 26 AM. HIST. REV. 717, 717 
(1921). 
 48. See PETER C. PERDUE, CHINA MARCHES WEST: THE QING CONQUEST OF 
CENTRAL EURASIA 6 (2005). See also EILEEN H. TAMURA ET AL., CHINA: UNDERSTANDING 
ITS PAST 127 (1997). See generally FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR., THE FALL OF IMPERIAL 
CHINA 55–70 (1975).  
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the establishment of a new reign, each dynasty failed almost in the same 
way as did its predecessor.49  It began with a courageous leader who led a 
rebellion to overthrow a corrupt dynasty ruled by an incompetent 
emperor.50  To justify the uprising, the leader would make his followers 
believe that the emperor had lost the Mandate of Heaven to rule the 
country.51  The leader would then declare himself emperor, and begin a 
new dynasty.52  In the beginning, the new emperor would abolish harsh 
laws, reduce taxes, revive the economy, and achieve a period of 
prosperity.53  Several generations into the dynasty, the successors became 
reluctant to carry out their founding emperor’s policies.54  Instead of 
maintaining a benevolent way of governance, they would increase taxes, 
impose draconian laws, and persecute intellectuals.55  In the end, 
rebellions would break out.56  Any emergencies, such as foreign 
invasions or natural disasters, would push the already weakened dynasty 
to its breaking point.57  Later, another ambitious leader would emerge 
and start a new cycle.58   
3. THE ZHOU DYNASTY  
The Zhou Dynasty holds a special place in the study of Chinese legal 
history not only because Confucius lived then, but also because the major 
legal principles of traditional Chinese law took shape during that time.
 59  
The Duke of Zhou first articulated the theory of benevolent governance, 
which became a basis for Confucianism and a model for subsequent 
dynasties.60  After drawing lessons from the failures of the previous 
  
 49. TAMURA ET AL., supra note 48, at 127.   
 50. Id. 
 51. See WAKEMAN, JR., SUPRA NOTE 48. 
 52. See TAMURA ET AL., supra note 48, at 127.   
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See WAKEMAN, JR., SUPRA NOTE 48. 
 58. See J.M. ROBERTS & O.A WESTAD, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
130–31 (2013).  
 59. See MA XIAOHONG (马小红), ZHONGGUO GUDAI FALV SHIXIANG SHI (中国古
代法律思想史) [HISTORY OF ANCIENT CHINA’S LEGAL THOUGHTS] 24–27 (2004).   
 60. Id. at 27.  
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dynasties, the Duke warned that when a king fell from the favor of 
Heaven, he would lose the mandate to govern the country.61  To stay in 
Heaven’s grace, a king must feel compassion for people’s living 
conditions, especially for the widowed, orphaned, and disabled.62  The 
Duke advised that the king must use punishment as a last resort and 
administer the law judiciously to avoid harming innocent people.63  
Those who committed crimes should have a chance to modify their 
behaviors before sanctioned with penalties.64 
The king was expected to set an example for his subjects by fulfilling 
his fiduciary duty to Heaven with utmost care.65  To maintain full 
support, the king must treat royal relatives and nobilities (the privileged 
class) differently from commoners.66  The privileged should not be 
subject to harsh criminal penalties except in egregious cases.67  The 
principle of inequality before the law was well summarized as the 
following: “[the] rules of polite behavior (li) do not reach down to the 
common people; the punishments (hsing) do not reach up to the great 
dignitaries.”68  Subsequent dynasties codified the principle of inequality 
in the penal code to exempt the privileged class from the legal system.69 
Therefore, the dynastic governance, including the legal system that 
matured in the Qin Dynasty, remained in its original form without 
substantial changes.70 
a. The Origin of the Zhou Dynasty  
The origin of the Zhou people is uncertain.71  While some speculate 
that the Zhou tribe was from the western frontier of the Shang Dynasty,
 72 
  
 61. Id. at 24–25.  
 62. Id. at 25.  
 63. Id. at 25–26.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 25.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China Exemplified by 190 
Ch’ing Dynasty Cases 23 (1973).  
 69. See The Great Qing Code 36 (WILLIAM C. JONES ET AL. TRANS., 1994); The 
T’ang Code 83 (WALLACE JOHNSON TRANS., 1997).  
 70. See A.F.P HULSEWÉ, REMNANTS OF HAN LAW 7 (1955).  
 71. J.A.G. Roberts, A Concise History of China 7 (1999).  
 72. Id.   
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others believe that the Zhou tribe migrated from the central plain of 
present-day Shanxi province.73  Mencius once called the Zhou King “a 
man of the western barbarians,” a derogatory term for people who were 
not culturally Chinese.74 
Historians attribute the emergence and survival of the Zhou tribe to its 
openness and adaptive nature.  The Zhou people were receptive to people 
of different cultures and beliefs.75  Through interacting with proto-
Tibetan Qiang people, Zhou rulers built a strong coalition, which set the 
basis for its subsequent expansion.76  By the 12
th
 century B.C., the Zhou 
tribe settled in the Wei valley, to the west of present-day Xi’an.77  The 
Zhou people learned the culture and administrative skills from the Shang 
Dynasty and eventually became its vassals.78  
In 1045 B.C., King Wu, the Zhou King, commanded 45,000 troops 
and waged an attack on the Shang.79  Even though the Shang sent 
700,000 men to battle, it suffered a total defeat because many refused to 
fight for the Shang King, who was cruel and oppressive to his people.80  
Unwilling to confront the humiliation, the Shang King committed suicide 
by setting himself on fire, marking the end of the Shang Dynasty.81 
b. Mandate of Heaven  
Conquering a nation is one thing but asserting sovereignty over that 
nation is quite another.  Following the surprise victory in 1045 B.C., the 
Zhou King82 was anxious about how to govern the Shang people, who 
  
 73. The Cambridge History of Ancient China—From the Origins of Civilization 
to 221 B.C., at 303 (Michael Loewe & Edward L. Shaughnessy eds., 1999) [hereinafter A 
Cambridge History].   
 74. Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China 59 (1970).  
 75. John King Fairbank & Merle Goldman, China: A New History 39 (1998). 
 76. Id.   
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.   
 79. A Cambridge History, supra note 73, at 309.  
 80. CREEL, supra note 74, at 57.  
 81. The History of the Zhou Dynasty, SUTORI, https://www.sutori.com/item/di-
xin-was-the-last-king-of-the-shang-dynasty-1075-1046bce-in-his-early-year (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2020).  
 82. See TONY JAQUES, DICTIONARY OF BATTLES AND SIEGES: A GUIDE 
TO 8,500 BATTLES FROM ANTIQUITY THOUGH THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 700 (2007). 
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were advanced in culture and tradition.83  Despite the conquest, the 
Shang people still regarded the Zhou as an uncivilized tribe incapable of 
replacing the Shang.84  In response, the Zhou King offered an ingenious 
argument, purportedly made for the first time in Chinese history.85  It was 
Heaven’s intention that made the Zhou unstoppable in its conquest 
because the Shang King had already lost the Mandate of Heaven and the 
Zhou King merely acted upon Heaven’s direction to save the Shang 
people from their oppressive King.86  Therefore, the conquest was not a 
predatory act, but a “benevolent undertaking” to rescue the people in 
misery.87  With the Mandate of Heaven bestowed onto the Zhou King, it 
was legitimate for him to rule the Shang people.88  Thereafter, the Zhou 
Kings called themselves tyanzi, or Son of Heaven, which was used by all 
subsequent emperors until the fall of Qing in 1912.89 
The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven was not just a propaganda tool 
for the conqueror to justify a new regime. It also imposed enormous 
responsibility on the ruler to hold onto the Mandate.  Realizing the 
boundless anxiety that the Mandate brought to the King,90 the Duke of 
Zhou warned that if the King failed to respect Heaven, he would lose the 
Mandate the same way as did the Shang King did.91  It seemed that the 
King’s focus was on Heaven, but his true focus was on the people.92  The 
reactions of the people were the bellwether for the King to judge the 
mood of Heaven.  Therefore,  King Wu claimed, “[m]en should not 
mirror themselves in water, but in the people . . . I am concerned only 
about Heaven and people.”93  While there is not an exhaustive list of 
duties for a King to fulfill, he must avoid the following:  
1. Failure to punish crimes and demonstrate clemency;  
  
 83. Shang Dynasty – China’s First Recorded History, U.S. HISTORY, 
https://www.ushistory.org/CIV/9B.ASP (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).  
 84. See id. at 60.  
 85. Id. at 82 (“We cannot tell how early the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven 
was in existence, but it is mentioned repeatedly in the speeches of King Wu.”).  
 86. See id.  
 87. Id. at 85.  
 88. Id. at 84. 
 89. See FRANK M. FLANAGAN, CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS AND WESTERN 
EDUCATION 115 (2011).   
 90. See CREEL, supra note 74, at 98.  
 91. See id.  
 92. See id.  
 93. Id.  
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2. Failure to show respect for god and ancestors;  
3. Failure to treat the tasks of government with respect;  
4. Failure to stay sober;  
5. Failure to promote the welfare of the people. 94    
 
In the Han Dynasty, Confucians refined the doctrine of the Mandate 
of Heaven based on the Yin-Yang theory.95  The signs of losing the 
Mandate included natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, famine, 
and droughts.96 
c. Enfeoffment  
Following its sudden military victory, the Zhou King urgently needed 
to exert effective control over the vast land once ruled by the Shang, and 
pacify the wrath of the Shang people, who deemed the Zhou people as 
rustic and “without culture.”97  King Wu sent royal relatives to defend 
various strategic regions across the country.98  In addition, the King 
permitted the son of the Shang King to become a vassal to “continue the 
sacrifices to the Shang Kings.”99  By doing so, the Zhou King intended to 
portray himself as a benevolent ruler to ease tensions with the Shang 
people.100  During this process, Zhou invented a set of rules to govern the 
relationships between the King and the newly enfeoffed lords.101  
  
 94. See id. at 94–97 (discussing the various duties that a King should not avoid 
when serving the people). 
 95. YU-LAN, supra note 23, at 192. 
 96. Id. at 198.  
 97. CREEL, supra note 74, at 60, 70.  
 98. A Cambridge History, supra note 73, at 311.  
 99. CREEL, supra note 74, at 70. 
 100. Id. 
 101. CHIN, supra note 17, at 43. Professor Annping Chin recreated the scene of a 
typical enfeoffment ceremony:  
Whenever [the Zhou King] appointed a member of the imperial family to create a colony 
elsewhere, they would hold an audience in the capital, and the ceremony that followed 
would include a feast and libation, and a display of archery. Court scribes would be 
present on such occasions.  They would prepare a record of the royal command and of the 
words exchanged, and they would include a description of the rituals.  At the conclusion 
of the investiture, the conferee would depart with a copy of the record, and often he 
would have it inscribed on a bronze vessel to commemorate this important moment in his 
life. Id. 
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Following the royal order, the enfeoffed lords established various 
states across the country.102  One such state was Lu, which was founded 
by Duke Zhou’s elder son.103  Five-hundred years later, Confucius was 
born in the State of Lu.  Confucius was proud of being a cultural 
descendant of the Duke of Zhou, whom he admired for his bravery, 
integrity, and wisdom.104  At the end of his life, Confucius sighed, 
“Extreme is my decay. For a long time, I have not dreamed . . . that I saw 
the duke of Chow.”105 
d. The Fall of the Feudal Order and Confucius’s Ideals  
Even though the Zhou Dynasty lasted 800–900 years, the longest 
dynasty in Chinese history,106 it did not exert actual control over the 
enfeoffed states for a large part of its reign.107  The states were far away 
from the King and the communication between the King and his subjects 
was sparse.108  According to the enfeoffment covenants, the states were 
obligated to be loyal to the King and to come to the dynasty’s defense 
when called for.109  
In the beginning, the enfeoffed lords identified themselves as part of 
Zhou; thus, they had a sense of duty to the dynasty.110  However, as time 
went by both the legal bonds and consanguineous ties to the King faded 
  
 102. See A CAMBRIDGE HISTORY, supra note 73, at 311–12, for a complete list of 
states established by enfeoffed lords.  
 103. Yang Chaoming (杨朝明), Kongzi “Meng Zhougong” de Lishi Jiedu – 
Kongzi Yanjiu Yuan, Jining Ribao She Lianhe Juban “Chunqiu Jiangtan” Zhailu (孔子”
梦周公”的历史解读) [Historical Interpretation of Confucius’s “Dreaming of Duke of 
Zhou” – An Excerpt from “Chunqiu Forum” Jointly Hosted by the Institute of Confucius 
and Jining Daily], JINING RIBAO [JINING DAILY], May 13, 2011. 
 104. Id.  
 105. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 196. 
 106. Meyer, supra note 46, at 129 (stating the Zhou Dynasty lasted from 1122 or 
1027–221 B.C.).    
 107. Id. at 130 (“[The Zhou] kings reigned but did not rule.”). 
 108. Id. at 129 (“[B]ecause of extended periods of warfare and the existence of 
strong city-states, the central authority was often only a hollow name.”).  
 109. Qizhi Zhang, An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture 141 (2015). 
 110. CREEL, supra note 74, at 100. “At the beginning of Western Chou, feudalism 
. . . was a new institution. The feudal lords were instruments of the King; they had not yet 
achieved a degree of independence that could impair the essentially centralized character 
of the government.” 
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away.111  At the same time, the states grew both in size and wealth due to 
the development of agricultural techniques, commercial transactions, and 
administrative measures.112  The lords of younger generations no longer 
felt the same attachment to the King as did their predecessors.  The lords 
viewed their states as their sovereign territories and saw no obligation to 
the King sitting afar.113   
Within each state, the same pattern continued.  The state lord sub-
enfeoffed cities and towns to his close relatives.114  After several 
generations, the sub-enfeoffed relatives—also called hereditary 
families—grew independent from the lord.115  Thus, they lost their sense 
of loyalty and respect for the lord of the states.  In the State of Lu, for 
example, each of the three hereditary families had a fortified city of its 
own.116  Each family had a strong army that only answered to the 
hereditary lord.117  Most of the state’s wealth was concentrated within the 
three families.118  Furthermore, the three families controlled the state’s 
political, social, and military affairs.119 
During Confucius’s lifetime, the feudal system established by the 
Zhou King began to unravel.120  Conflicts developed not only between 
states and the Zhou King but also among states themselves.121  Within 
each state, the tension between the lords and the hereditary families was 
  
 111. Chin, supra note 17, at 43–44.  
 112. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 15–16. 
 113. Meyer, supra note 46, at 130 (“[K]ings reigned, but did not rule. The 
aristocracy became more independent and in the continual wars and strife, feudalism 
rose. Monarchs were manipulated by a league of vassals headed by an overlord.”).  
 114. See Chin, supra note 17, at 50 (discussing how the descendants of Zhou were 
the rulers of Lu starting with the son of the Duke of Zhou who was first enfeoffed).  
 115. Id. Confucius was concerned about the growing power of the hereditary 
families. Id. (“‘Their wealth [the hereditary family’s wealth] is greater than that of [the 
descendants of] the Duke of Zhou’; ‘They have eight rows of eight dancers, [sixty-four in 
all,] to perform in their courtyard. If this can be tolerated, what cannot be tolerated?’”).” 
 116. See id. at 29 (discussing the rebel attacks on the cities controlled by the 
hereditary families).  
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 28–30.  
 119. See id. at 42–43.  
 120. See id. at 47.   
 121. See id. at 49–50.  
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equally intense.122  Confucius’s time was a period of disorder and 
struggle.123  
What Confucius envisioned was far divorced from the reality he lived 
in.  He vividly described a utopia, which he firmly believed to have 
existed during the peak of the Zhou Dynasty:  
When the rule of propriety prevailed, the power belonged to all people.  
The able and talented administrated state affairs.  People were sincere 
and friendly to each other. They treated other people’s parents and 
children with the same love and affection as they did their own.  The 
elderly had abundant resources to enjoy their lives until death.  Young 
people had the means to live up to their full potential.  The able-bodied 
retained employment.  The widowed, orphaned, and disabled were 
treated with kindness and compassion and provided with adequate 
support.  While men worked outside, women kept homes in order.  
People strived to harness natural resources not for their own profits, but 
for the common good.  Since there were no conspiracies, rebellions, 
thefts, or any other crimes, people did not lock their doors at night.  It 
was a world in unity.
124
  
Confucius prescribed the path to realizing the harmonious society he 
conjured: people must restrain themselves and return to the rites of Zhou 
( keji fuli or克己复礼).125  “‘To subdue one’s self and return to propriety, 
is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to 
propriety, all  under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him.”126  When 
people restrained themselves and acted upon the rule of propriety, the 
world would be in the right order just like the early Zhou experienced—
the King at the pinnacle of the social pyramid held the absolute authority; 
regional lords demonstrated utmost respect for and loyalty to the King; 
hereditary families within each state were subordinate to the state lords; 
and commoners were submissive to the nobles.127  
  
 122. See id. at 28–30.  
 123. See id. at 42–43.  
 124. SUN XIDAN, LIJI JIJIE [ANNOTATED BOOK OF RITES] 581–83 (Shen Xiaohuan & 
Wang Xingxian eds., 1989).  
 125. CHIN, supra note 17, at 167.  
 126. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 250. 
 127. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 15.  
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4. THE LIFE OF CONFUCIUS128 
Confucius was born in 551 B.C. in the State of Lu, southwest of 
modern-day Shandong Province in China.129  His ancestry traced back to 
the King of Song, a state in the Spring and Autumn period.130  The birth 
of Confucius was a result of his father’s second marriage with a young 
woman from the Yan family.131  When Confucius was three, his father 
died.132  Since an early age, Confucius demonstrated a keen interest in 
learning rules of proper conduct for sacrificial offerings.133  
When Confucius was seventeen years old, Baron Meng Li of the State 
of Lu was near the end of his life.134  The Baron praised Confucius for his 
noble roots and his ancestors’ humble character, and contribution to the 
  
 128. There have been numerous versions of biographical sketches for Confucius 
during the past two millennia. Historians generally agree that Confucius’s biography in 
Sima Qian’s Shiji may be more reliable than others. See Wen, supra note 28, at 139. 
Supplemental recourses include JAMES LEGGE, THE CHINESE CLASSICS: WITH A 
TRANSLATION, CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL NOTES, PROLEGOMENA, AND COPIOUS INDEXES 
(1861); SU WANG (王肃), KONGZI JIAYU (孔子家语) [FAMILY SAYINGS OF CONFUCIUS] 
(There have been numerous editions of this book. The sources that this article relied is 
from the edition by Deming Wang (王德明), KONGZI JIAYU YIZHU (孔子家语译注) 
[ANNOTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FAMILY SAYINGS OF CONFUCIUS] (1998) 
[hereinafter KJ 1998]. 
 129. Wen, supra note 28, at 139. 
 130. Id. at 139, 141. The period started in 771 B.C. and ended in 476 B.C. See The 
Warring States Period in China (475-221 BC), CHINA HIGHLIGHTS, 
https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/china-history/warring-states-period.htm 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020) [hereinafter The Warring States Period].  
 131. Id. at 139. Sima Qian used the word “野合”, which means engaging an 
intercourse in the wild. See id. Legge offered a more elaborated account about 
Confucius’s birth: Confucius’s father Shuh-leang Heih married twice. During his first 
marriage, his wife bore him only nine daughters. A concubine finally gave him a crippled 
son. Already in his 70s, Shuh-leang Heih sought a second marriage in the Yan’s family, 
which had three daughters, the youngest being Ching-tsae who become his wife and gave 
birth to Confucius. LEGGE, supra note 128, at 58. 
 132. Wen, supra note 28, at 140. See also, QIAN MU (钱穆), 孔子传 [BIOGRAPHY 
OF CONFUCIUS] (2002).  
 133. Id. at 140. By adding the details about Confucius children, Sima Qian 
probably wanted to show that Confucius was precocious in understanding, “Li” the ritual 
that became the center piece of Confucianism. Li 禮 [Ritual Propriety], KURTIS HAGEN, 
https://kurtishagen.com/confucianism/li/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (discussing how one 
should “act with attention and care characteristic of the performance of a sacred rite”).  
 134. Id. at 141.  
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State of Song.135  He prophesied that Confucius would be a magnificent 
scholar and asked his son to study Chinese classics with him.136  Either 
because of the Baron’s prediction or his promotion, Confucius was soon 
put in charge of a local granary.137  He managed the granary successfully, 
setting an example for other managers.138  Then, Confucius catapulted 
into stardom in Lu’s political circle. In a few years, Confucius 
experienced a meteoric rise in his political career from being the Minister 
of Construction to the Minister of Justice, and then acting Prime 
Minister.139  
During his tenure as an acting Prime Minister, Confucius quickly 
restored peace and order to Lu: marketers no longer swindled shoppers, 
men and women took separate roads in public (the social norm at the 
time), crime disappeared, and people received foreign guests warmly at 
their homes without a request from the State.140  
With Confucius’s increasing role in the state affairs of Lu, the Duke 
of Qi, a rival neighbor of Lu, was concerned that Confucius would make 
Lu a strong state and conquer Qi in the future.141  The Duke of Qi invited 
the Duke of Lu to negotiate a peace treaty in a valley on the border 
between the two states.142 In fact, the invitation was Qi’s ruse to kill the 
Duke of Lu during the conference.143   The Duke of Lu naively believed 
that Qi’s invitation was a friendly overture, thus he did not plan to bring 
his military entourage.144  Only upon Confucius’s urging did the Duke 
agree to bring his guards in case of emergency.145  
During the conference, the Duke of Qi entertained the guests from Lu 
with a dance by a group of barbarians armed with sharp weapons.146  
When the men approached dangerously close to the Duke of Lu, 
Confucius hurried to the stage of the meeting and exclaimed that the 
  
 135. See id. 
 136. See id.  
 137. See id. at 143.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 143–148 
 140. Id. at 147–48.  
 141. Id. 143.  
 142. Id.  
 143. See id. At 143–44.   
 144. See id. at 143. 
 145. See id.  
 146. See id. 
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armed barbarians dancing in front of Duke of Lu violated Li, the rule of 
proper conduct that governed state relations.147  He requested that all the 
barbarian dancers be evicted.148 The Duke of Qi was embarrassed that his 
plot was foiled and ordered the evacuation of all the dancers.149 After the 
encounter, the Duke of Qi was even more fearful of Confucius for his 
wisdom and courage.150  To mend the rift, the Duke of Qi returned the 
towns that he seized in previous battles back to Lu.151   
Under Confucius’s tutelage, Lu became prosperous and peaceful.152 
The Duke of Qi once again felt threatened by the prospect that Lu would 
soon prevail in the battle for hegemony among the warring states.153  To 
avoid annihilation, the Duke of Qi sent 80 female dancers and 120 horses 
as a gift to the Duke of Lu.154  Over Confucius’s objection, the Duke of 
Lu accepted the gift.155  As the Duke of Lu indulged in the dancers, he 
neglected his official duties.156  Thus, Confucius lost confidence in the 
Duke of Lu and left the kingdom with his students.157  The Duke later 
regretted that he alienated Confucius by refusing to follow his advice.158  
Other sources offered a different account regarding the cause of 
Confucius’s exile,159 suggesting he was simply forced out of Lu after his 
  
 147. See id. Li governed individual conduct as well as international relations. The 
peacetime and wartime li is analogous to today’s international law. See YU-LAN, supra 
note 23, at 178.  
 148. Wen, supra note 28, at 143. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 144. 
 151. Id. Musheng Li gave a different account on Qi returning the seized territories 
to Lu: At the end of the negotiation, Qi demanded Lu to contribute 300 chariots when Qi 
was on a war with the enemy, LI MUSHENG , KONGZI ZHUAN (孔子传) [A BIOGRAPHY OF 
CONFUCIUS] 104 (2016). Failure to do so, Lu would be in breach of the alliance treaty. Id. 
Confucius realized that it was impractical for Lu to refuse the term because Qi was a 
bigger state, but it was humiliating for Lu to accept it without having anything in return. 
Id. He requested Qi to return the three towns that it seized during a previous war as a 
condition for Lu to accept Qi’s term. Id.  
 152. See Wen, supra note 28, at 147.  
 153. Id. at 146.  
 154. See id.  
 155. See id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. See id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 28–30. 
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failed attempt to curb the influence of the three hereditary families.160  
After gaining the high office at the Lu court, Confucius thought it was 
time to mold Lu according to his ideals.161 In a perfect Confucian world, 
the Duke is on the top of the hierarchical structure and everyone else is 
submissive to the Duke.162 In reality, however, the three hereditary 
families held the real political, economic, and military power of Lu.163 
They had their fortified cities to their own guarded by their own 
troops.164 They defied the Duke’s orders, appropriated the State financial 
resources for their own use.165 The families demonstrated neither respect 
for nor loyalty to the Duke.166 To change the status quo, Confucius 
conspired with military strongmen to destroy the three families’ 
compounds and restore the Duke’s supremacy, but his plot ended 
disastrously.167 Confucius and his students had no choice but to flee Lu 
for their lives.168   
Confucius roamed with his students from one state to another hoping 
to be a state counselor, but he never managed to convince anyone to 
apply his teaching.169 Some states respected him as a scholar, but they all 
declined to appoint him to a key political post.170 Confucius once 
complained that his talent was wasted lamenting, “[i]f there were any of 
the princes who would employ me, in the course of twelve months, I 
should have done something considerable. In three years, the government 
  
 160. See id.  
 161. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 184 (“If any one employ me, may I 
not make an eastern Chow [Zhou]?”). This passage revealed Confucius’s goal was to 
restore the hierarchical structure according to rule of propriety or “Li” See YU-LAN, 
supra note 23, at 178. 
 162. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 184.  
 163. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 28–30. 
 164. See id.  
 165. See id.  
 166. See id.  
 167. See id. at 30–31.  
 168. See id. at 28–30. 
 169. Id. at 91–92 (explaining that “[a]fter his return to Wei, Confucius became 
anxious about finding a job there.” And that “[H]e was desperate for a position in Duke 
of Liang’s government[.]”). 
 170. Id. at 92 (“Why do you worry about [Confucius] not having an office? The 
world has long been without a moral way. Heaven is about to use your master as the 
wooden tongue for a bronze bell.”).  
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would be perfected.”171 These states rejected Confucius because his 
teaching set too high a moral bar for them to uphold.172 At the same time, 
each individual state feared that their intimidating neighbors might retain 
Confucius and make them even more threatening.173 To prevent giving 
advantage to their rivals, one state plotted to besiege,174 or even 
attempted to assassinate Confucius, albeit not successfully.175  
Despite repeated rejections and occasional besieges, Confucius stayed 
calm and focused on the study of classics during his arduous journey.176  
When his students asked him why he did not worry about his safety, he 
replied, “If the Heaven ignores moral values, it would have its own way 
to prohibit me from studying classics.  [In fact], the Heaven promotes the 
moral values, how can these hostile states bother me?177  Since the 
Heaven allows me to study and bestows moral values to me, why should 
I be [worried] about these attacks?”178 Finally, Confucius went back to 
Lu after fourteen years of exile.179 No longer interested in working for 
the Duke of Lu, Confucius devoted his heart and soul to teaching and 
editing classics, until his death in 479 B.C.180 
a. The Case of Shaozheng Mao 
Confucius’s biographical sketch in Shiji, the Historical Record, seems 
impeccable.  However, the biography omitted an event that Confucius’s 
followers have vigorously tried to deny as truth for thousands of years: 
On his seventh day as the Minister of Justice, Confucius ordered the 
  
 171. CONFUCIUS ANALECTS, supra note 44, at 131. 
 172. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 89. For example, while seeking a job from the 
State of Wei, he openly talked about the moral depravity of the Duke of Wei. Id. 
 173. Wen, supra note 28, at 156–57. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. When Confucius and his students were practicing rituals under a big tree, 
an agent from the State of Song cut the tree. The falling tree trunk barely missed 
Confucius. Id. Sima Qian did not say why the agent did not kill Confucius directly. Id. A 
reasonable guess would be that no one wanted to bear the guilt for murdering the sage. Id. 
If Confucius died as a result of a falling tree, the State of Song could claim it an accident 
for which no one was responsible. Id.  
 176. See id. at 153.  
 177. Id. at 152–53.  
 178. Id. at 153.  
 179. Id. at 159.  
 180. Id. at 165–68, 172.  
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execution of Shaozheng Mao for the crime of perverted speech. This 
punishment was viewed as disproportionately severe even by 
Confucius’s contemporaries.181  When a student asked him if he regretted 
his decision, Confucius replied:  
Sit down, and I will tell you the reasons. Now there are five odious 
predilections humans can possess, and robbing and thieving are not 
amongst them. The first is having a penetrating but pernicious mind. 
the second is being partial yet stubborn in conduct the third is speaking 
falsehood and loving disputation. The fourth is having the capacity of a 
fine memory but retaining only the bad and the ugly. The fifth is being 
inclined to wrongdoing yet never short of justifications. A person with 
just one of these tendencies would inevitably end up being executed by 
a gentleman. Yet Shaozheng Mao had all five. Moreover, wherever he 
happened to be residing, he had enough appeal to draw a crowd of 
followers around him; and whenever he opened his mouth, he had 
enough slickness to disguise his depraved nature and to hoodwink his 
audience. This man was so powerful that when he turned right and 
wrong on their heads, no one could call his bluff and bring him down. 
He was a hero to petty men and so he had to be put to death.
182
   
To justify Confucius’s action, Xunzi cited seven early cases where 
highly revered state counselors sentenced evil-minded men to death for 
the same crime committed by Shaozheng Mao.183  One of them was Deng 
Xi, who was a lawyer representing clients in their private interests.184  He 
“charged his clients a long robe for a major case and a short robe for a 
lesser one.”185  Zichan, the counselor of Zheng, accused Deng Xi of 
being so driven by profit that he destroyed “any standard of right and 
wrong.”186  One account vividly recorded how Deng Xi interfered with 
the counselor’s official functions:  
In the state of Zheng, many people liked to post their writings [along 
the main routes and byways].  Zichan ordered the posts to be stopped.  
  
 181. Wang Xianqian et al., Xunzi Jijie (荀子宥坐) [XUNZI ANNOTATED] 520 
(1988). 
 182. See CHIN, supra note 17, at 156. 
 183. Id. at 157. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 158.  
 186. Id. 
2020] Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition 499 
Deng Xi began to pass out slips of his writings.  Zichan again ordered it 
to be stopped.  Deng Xi then began to attach his writings to other things 
he sent out.  The infinite number of ordinances was matched by Deng 
Xi’s infinite number of attempts to circumvent them.
 187
   
It was a crime for Deng Xi to argue against the government.188  It was 
another crime for him to represent a client for profit as he argued against 
the government.189  It was yet another, far more serious crime for him to 
circumvent the government’s “firewall” which was designed to censor 
public opinions.190  If there had been a way, Zichan would have put Deng 
Xi to death three times.  Deng Xi caused confusion and sowed the seed 
of discord.191  He would have been executed in any of the subsequent 
dynasties.  Therefore, the execution of Deng Xi did not in any way taint 
Zichan’s legacy as a righteous statesman because he did what any dutiful 
state counselor would have done.192  In fact, the execution may have 
contributed to his reputation as a diligent caretaker of the State’s 
interests.  
Compared with Deng Xi, Shaozheng Mao was less culpable because 
he did not obstruct State censorship.  Yet, Confucius put him to death.  
Imagine what would happen if a lawyer spoke to the media after making 
a legal argument for his client in Confucius’s court. The result would be 
terrifying.  Two millennia later, this fear persists.193  
  
 187. Id.  
 188. See Zhao Jinkai (赵金慨), “Qiangu Guibian Diyi Ren” Dengxi (“千古诡辩
第一人”邓析) [The Pioneer of Sophism, Dengxi], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) 
[PEOPLE’S CT. DAILY], June 22, 2018, sec. 5. See also ZHAO XIAOGENG (赵晓耕), 
ZHONGGUA FAZHI SHI [HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM] (2004); Han Xing (韩星), 
Dengxi Yu Mingjia,Fajia (邓析与明家，法家) [Dengxi, School of Names, and 
Legalism], SHAN’XI SHIFAN DAXUE JIXU JIAOYU XUEBAO (陕西师范大学继续教育学院
学报) [J. OF FURTHER EDUC. OF SHAANXI NORMAL U.], Sept. 2006, at 32. 
 189. Zhao supra note 188.  
 190. Id.   
 191. Id.  
 192. See WANG DEMING (王肃), KONGZI JIAYU YIZHU (孔子家语 译注) [FAMILY 
SAYINGS OF CONFUCIUS ANNOTATED] 163 (1998) (explaining how Confucius praised 
Zichan’s devotion to his home state). 
 193. SIDA LIU & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE 
POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK 18 (2016) (“The legislative history of China’s criminal 
law dates back to Western Zhou (ca.1100-771 BCE) . . . but until a draft of Great Qing 
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Another explanation for Shaozheng Mao’s execution is that Confucius 
was furious after discovering that his students had left him for 
Shaozheng Mao.194  If this account were true, it would have been the first 
unfair competition case in Chinese legal history.  
b. Confucius : The Eternal Patriarch    
At the end of his life, Confucius marveled, “[e]verything passes on 
like the river . . .  [d]ay and night, it never ceases.”195  He may have 
regretted that he could not accomplish his ideals before his passing.  
However, he failed to see the enduring legacy he left behind —a 
perpetual institutional framework that has been governing one-quarter of 
the world that persists today.  Metaphysically, the river that he referred to 
may have never come back, but the track of the river that meandered 
through the Chinese souls remains eternal.  
Confucius did not consider himself a god.196  He did not even believe 
that he could create a new idea, not to mention a world.197  As he saw it, 
he was a mere transmitter through which the Duke of Zhou’s ideals were 
carried.198  He had no intent to be a theorist or a deity.199  Brought up by 
  
Criminal Procedure Code was finished in 1910, there had never been a separate criminal 
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his mother alone, which was extremely rare in his time, he witnessed the 
sufferings of his class.200  As an ordinary person, he strived to climb the 
social ladder to be above the commoners.201  Confucius studied Chinese 
classics hoping one day to become a counselor in a royal court.202  This 
was reflected in his work in politics where he dedicated himself to 
understanding the rules and procedures to properly instruct the rulers in 
order to fulfill his mission to rejuvenate the glory the Duke of Zhou once 
experienced.203  In fact, he did succeed in politics as a minister of 
justice.204  When he found politics did not work for him, he devoted 
himself to teaching students and editing the classics.205  Unlike other 
religious founders, Confucius’s focus was solely on the past and present, 
not at all on the future.206  He firmly believed that the present should be 
exactly like the past.207  Confucius had no intent to establish a religion, 
but the proper rule of conduct he vigorously advocated has regulated the 
behaviors of a large swath of the world population for two millennia.208  
In a sense, Confucius is an accidental divinity, whose future was the past.  
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5. LET A HUNDRED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONTEND  
During Confucius’s time,209 the rising of independent states reduced 
the Zhou Dynasty to only a symbolic figurehead with its power confined 
to the capital.210  With diminishing control from the central government, 
states competed for territories, resources and influence.211 Either for 
survival or expansion, each state felt an urgent need to recruit deep-
thinkers to help it gain a competitive edge over its rivals.212  The intense 
demand for new ideas stimulated the supply of unique talents.  Like 
Confucius, other great thinkers were devoted to constructing innovative 
theories.213  More importantly, the unfettered discourse among the 
thinkers enriched their thoughts and sharpened their views.  It was an 
unprecedented golden age in Chinese history for the market of ideas to 
flourish.214  Thanks to this rare window of freedom, hundreds of schools 
of thought emerged to contend in an open arena.215  It is paradoxical that 
Confucius’s dream was to return to Zhou’s glory when the King was in 
control of every aspect of society, which would have rendered his free-
thinking impossible.  As a result, Confucius might not regret that he did 
not live to see his thoughts adopted as the official ideology.  An official 
endorsement was not necessarily based on merit, but on whether a school 
of thought was suitable to the ruler’s taste.  In that regard, Confucianism 
prevailed.216  
a. Confucianism  
The core concept of Confucianism is Li, or rules of conduct, which 
has been subject to a wide range of explanations.217 Generally, Li had two 
meanings: first, it meant rites—a set of protocols the Zhou Kings 
  
 209. The time of Confucius is often referred to as the Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States Period (771 B.C.-221 B.C.). See The Warring States Period, supra note 
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followed in performing sacrificial offerings to spirit and ancestors.218  It 
also included rules for conducting traditional ceremonial functions, such 
as weddings, funerals, and official ceremonies.219  Second, Li meant rules 
of proper conduct (propriety).220  Confucians maintained that “[i]f 
[people] be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the 
rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will 
become good.”221  Li was also used to distinguish the superior from the 
inferior and the noble from the humble.222 By observing Li, no one would 
deviate from his place on the social ladder, and society would be in peace 
and order.223  Through studying history, Confucius concluded that when 
the Emperor, not his subjects, determined state affairs, his reign would 
maintain its prosperity and longevity.224  However, if inferiors acted 
against the Emperor, the State would not survive more than a few 
generations. 225 
Another key concept in Confucianism is Ren (love or benevolence), 
which is the basic principle concerning various social relations.226  
Within a family, a father should be benevolent, sons filial, elder brothers 
fraternal, and younger brothers subordinate.227  In the government, “[a] 
prince should employ his minister according to the rule of propriety; 
ministers should serve their prince with faithfulness.”228  When dealing 
with others, the guiding principle should be “not to do to others as you 
would not wish done to yourself.”229  “[T]he man of perfect virtue, 
wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing 
to [grow] himself, he seeks also to [grow] others.”230  
Confucius believed that coercive means, such as law and punishment, 
were unnecessary because social order would be maintained by Li and 
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Ren.231  In an ideal society, there should be no need for litigation.232  
Confucius explained that “‘[i]f people be led by laws . . . they will try to 
avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. ‘If they be led by 
virtue . . . they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become 
good.’”233 
Nevertheless, under some special circumstances, Confucius did not 
completely negate the role of law and punishment.234  For example, the 
Duke of Zheng advised his successor to take a strong approach in 
combating crimes, but his successor, Taishu, did not heed the advice.235  
As a result, a great number of thieves stole from local people.236  Taishu 
regretted his lenient approach and decided to use force to eliminate the 
criminals.  During a battle, government troops killed all of the 
criminals.237  Upon hearing the news, Confucius238 praised Taishu and 
explained why harsh laws were necessary in this instance:  
When the [government] is mild, the people despise it. When they 
despise it, severity must take its place. When the [government] is 
severe, the people are slaughtered.  When this takes place, they must be 
dealt with mildly. Mildness serves to temper severity, and severity to 
regulate mildness; —it is in this way that the administration of 
government is brought to harmony.
239
  
While Li and Ren were superior to the law, they could not completely 
replace it.  Confucius cautioned that law must only be used 
proportionately to deal with crimes and maintain social order.240  
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2020] Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition 505 
Disproportional use of the law would lead the people to resent the 
government.241  
b. Legalism  
Contrary to Confucianism, the Legalists ardently advocated for the 
law.242  The Legalists were not concerned about protecting human rights 
or limiting indulgence of the ruler; instead, they believed that the law 
was the most efficient tool to create a formidable “political and military 
apparatus.”243  Therefore, it is important to know that the “law” that the 
Legalists promoted is not the same as the “rule of law” in the West that 
protects human rights.244  “Law” is merely a convenient tool for the ruler 
to maintain social order.  Even though the Legalists believed in equality 
before the law, the ruler was above the law.245   
During the Warring States period,246 each individual state looked to 
overpower its rivals and unify China.247  To achieve this goal, the 
Legalists suggested that a ruler should promulgate stern punishments for 
even small offenses.248  They believed that most people were born selfish 
and greedy and could not be induced to behave by good virtue alone as 
Confucians assumed.249  Fearing severe punishments, the people would 
do as the State desired.250  The Legalists downplayed the cruelty that the 
law would bring by arguing that enforcing the seemingly harsh rules may 
never be needed because their mere existence would suffice to deter 
violations.251 “When punishments are heavy, the people dare not 
transgress, and therefore there will be no punishments.”252 
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In addition, the Legalists believed that these harsh laws must be 
accompanied by a reward system.253  This is consistent with their 
underlying assumption that most people would naturally seek profit and 
avoid punishment.254  Regardless, an award system would create an 
incentive for people to follow the ruler’s orders.  In the long run, the 
combination of reward and punishment would reduce the size of the 
government and prevent social disorder.255  Legalists believed that when 
a system of law was in place, individual capabilities became less 
relevant.256  By relying on laws, even an incapable ruler could govern the 
state efficiently.257   
Even though Legalism did not have the same influence as 
Confucianism, several of its unique features are still relevant today. First, 
the Legalists believed in uniformity before the law.258  Except for the 
ruler himself, everyone should be subject to the same legal punishment 
for violating the law.259  Even the feudal lords must be subjected to the 
same rules to ensure uniformity in enforcing the law.  The Lord of Shang 
concisely explained the meaning of equality before the law:    
What I mean by the unification of punishments is that punishments 
should know no degree or grade, but that from ministers of state and 
generals down to great officers and ordinary folk, whosoever does not 
obey the king’s commands, violates the interdicts of the state, or rebels 
against the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty of death and 
should not be pardoned.260 
Han Fei tzu agreed that “[t]he law does not favor the nobles . . . . 
However, the law is applied, the wise have no way of avoiding 
[punishment] . . . . To punish a fault does not exempt the great officials.  
To award merit does not exclude the commoners.’”261 
  
 253. MA, supra note 59, at 110. 
 254. Id. at 118.  
 255. See id. at 109–110.  
 256. See id.  
 257. BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 68, at 24.   
 258. Id. at 25.  
 259. Id. at 25. 
 260. CH’Ü, supra note 22, at 243. 
 261. Id. 
2020] Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition 507 
Only the short-lived Qin Dynasty abided by this principle.262 After its 
demise, the principle of equality before the law faded in subsequent 
dynasties.263  It was not until the fall of the last dynasty that it resurfaced 
to become a noble goal for revolutionaries.264 
Second, the law should be clear.  To achieve efficiency and stability, 
the Legalists emphasized that the consequences of breaking the law must 
be well-defined and universally known.265  Thus, the government must 
issue unambiguous laws, openly announce them, and enforce them 
consistently.266  By doing so, the government would send a clear message 
to the people as to what conduct was not permissible.267 After Qin, 
subsequent dynasties went to great lengths to preserve and enact clear 
legal codes.268  The Tang Code served as a model of precision and clarity 
for all the subsequent dynasties.269  
Third, in order to smoothly administer the system of punishment, it 
was crucial for the ruler to delegate the power of enforcing the law to 
officials.  In doing so, however, there was a risk that the officials may 
not enforce the law consistently and uniformly.270  To avoid this result, 
the Legalists suggested that the ruler should either reward or punish the 
officials depending on whether they applied the law according to the 
responsibilities required by their positions.271  The rules for these awards 
and punishments must be equally clear so that the officials knew exactly 
what to follow.  While this system ensured uniform application of the 
law, it did not leave any room for officials to inject their own creativity 
in solving complex cases.  One commentator pointed out that this system 
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effectively created an “impregnable barrier to the growth and application 
of forensic genius.”272  
Fourth, people should be held responsible as a group.  The Legalists 
believed that the government should endorse group accountability 
because people were inherently bad.273  They recommended the 
government divide the entire state population into small groups of five to 
ten families.274  Within the group, if one individual violated a law, every 
member was punished for the offense.275 Therefore, each member of the 
group was held responsible for preventing any transgressions against the 
state.   
In the Han Dynasty, an offender who committed heinous crimes or 
demonstrated impiety was punishable by being cut in half at the waist.276  
In addition, the offender’s parents, spouse, children, and siblings were all 
publicly executed.277  
Group responsibility had a long-lasting impact on the Chinese legal 
system—since Qin, dynasties used various methods of collective 
responsibility to maintain social order.  For example, the first Han 
Dynasty’s legal codes provided that if an individual committed one of 
the serious crimes, especially against the State, the State would not only 
execute the offender, but also “three lines of the offender’s families, 
including both parent’s families, the offender’s brothers’ families, and 
the offender’s wife’s families.”278  Other dynasties extended the penalty 
to “five lines of the offender by including his uncles’ families and sisters’ 
families.”279  Even though later dynasties reduced the execution to exile, 
this collective punishment method was commonly implemented until the 
end of the Imperialism period in China.280     
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c. Burning Books and Burying Scholars Alive 
Through a series of reforms, the Legalists helped Qin build a strong 
State with ruthless efficiency.  As a result, the State of Qin quashed all 
other rival states, unified China and established the first Dynasty in 221 
B.C.281  Qin Shi Huang, who claimed himself as the First Emperor of 
China, carried out a series of reforms and campaigns to strengthen his 
authority.282  He wholeheartedly endorsed the Legalist principles for his 
dynasty.  In 213 B.C., with the approval of the First Emperor, Prime 
Minister Li Si instigated the infamous “Burning Books and Burying the 
Scholars Alive” campaign to root out non-Legalist ideas.283  
To justify his campaign, Minister Li argued that Emperor Qin should 
ban outdated laws made by ancient rulers because the change of 
circumstances made them inapplicable in Qin.284  Even though hundreds 
of schools of thought had once contributed to the nation-building in other 
states, they became meaningless to Qin, who accomplished unification 
solely by relying on Legalism.285  Minister Li praised the First Emperor 
for setting an exemplary precedent of creating his own laws rather than 
following tradition.286   
Minister Li further argued that the non-Legalist scholars, in fact, 
posed a grave threat to the current regime because they often criticized 
Qin’s policies by invoking classical teachings.287  Some officials lauded 
the First Emperor at the royal court but slandered Qin’s policies when 
they privately convened.288  It was extremely dangerous for Qin to allow 
non-Legalist scholars to speak their minds freely because they could 
form an opposition and undermine the First Emperor’s authority.289  The 
First Emperor should be the only authority in deciding right and 
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wrong.290  Therefore, the government had to take draconian measures to 
eliminate the influence of non-Legalist scholars.291   
The Legalists convinced the First Emperor that military aggression 
would merely conquer rival states’ territories, but not the people’s minds.  
To achieve true unity, the First Emperor needed to eradicate dissenting 
literature and scholars.292  Punishing people who disobeyed was the most 
efficient means to unify people’s thoughts.293  Scholars who survived the 
brutal campaign would certainly remold themselves to abide by Qin’s 
rules.  As an old Chinese saying goes: “Killing a chicken to scare 
monkeys.”  Legalists maintained that the government must preemptively 
suppress dissent.294  As a result, Minister Li promulgated the following 
laws: 
1. Except for Qin’s, all historical records of other states shall be 
burned.  
2. Except for the official scholars who work for the Qin Dynasty, 
anyone in China who possesses copies of the Classic of Poetry, the 
Classic of History, or the writings of the hundred schools of thought 
shall surrender them to the local governors for burning.   
3. Anyone who discusses the Classic of Poetry or the Classic of 
History privately in small groups shall be publicly executed.  
4. Anyone who caricatures Qin’s present policies by quoting the 
classics shall have his family executed.  
5. Officials who have failed to report a violation of the above rules are 
equally guilty.  
  
 290. See id. 
 291. FUNG YU-LAN, supra note 23, at 204 (“[T]he world was scattered and in 
confusion . . . . Men valued what they have themselves privately studied, thus casting into 
disrepute what their superiors had established.  At present, Your Majesty has united the 
world . . . . Yet there are those who with their private teachings mutually abet each other, 
and discredit the institutions of laws and institutions . . . . If such conditions are not 
prohibited, the imperial power will decline above and partisanships will for below.”). 
 292. See Wen, supra note 28, at 254–55.  
 293. See id.  
 294. See id.  
2020] Confucius and the Chinese Legal Tradition 511 
6. After thirty days of this announcement, those who have failed to 
burn the books shall be defaced with dark ink and banished to labor 
camps, where they will defend Qin by day and build the Great Wall by 
night.  
7. Books on medicine, divination, agriculture, and forestry are 
exempted from burning.   
8. Anyone interested in the law shall only learn from Qin’s officials, 
not from historical or other sources.
 295
   
The government mercilessly enforced these laws.  Between 213 B.C. 
and 212 B.C., the Qin government burned all non-Legalist literature that 
it could find and executed 460 scholars by burying them alive for 
violation of Li’s laws.296   
The “Burning Books and Burying the Scholars Alive” campaign 
enabled the First Emperor to consolidate power.  However, the 
horrendous atrocities that Qin committed upon Confucian scholars and 
traditional culture galvanized resentment against the inhumane rules 
across the new country.297 Historians postulate that the brutal campaign 
hastened Qin’s demise.298  After the death of the First Emperor in 210 
B.C., the State of Qin quickly dissolved into rebellion and chaos.299   
With the fall of Qin, Legalism lost its dominance in the ideological 
contest with Confucianism for the rest of China’s long history.  
However, the chilling effect of the brutal campaign not only traumatized 
scholars during the Qin Dynasty, but all intellectuals for centuries to 
come.  In 1958, Mao Zedong commented on the “Burning Books and 
Burying the Scholars Alive” campaign as stating:  
Was it impressive for what First Emperor did?  He only buried 468 
Confucian scholars, but we buried 46,000 [anti-revolutionary scholars 
during the revolution].  We have debated with the Democrats over the 
justification of the mass executions.  They blamed us for being as cruel 
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as the First Emperor.  They were wrong.  We were 100 times as cruel as 
the First Emperor.  The Democrats likened us to either the First Emperor 
or dictator.  Yes, we absolutely accept that.  Unfortunately, what they 
accused of us is not enough.  We must supplement their argument.  (Mao 
laughed.)300 
d. Taoism as Transition  
The fall of Qin did not send China back into a prolonged period of 
warring states.  Among competing rebel forces, Liu Bang quickly 
consolidated power, and established the Han Dynasty in 202 BC.
 301 
Mindful of how the brutal punishments brought down the first dynasty, 
the Han Emperor commanded his advisors to study the root causes of 
Qin’s quick demise from an almighty empire to rubble and identify what 
Han could do to avoid the same fate.302  
Drawing ideas from the classics, the Emperor’s trusted counselors 
urged the government to follow the wisdom of Taoism, a non-action 
approach, relying on upright rules of nature to allow the people 
themselves to work out conflicts in society.303  After persistent wars, 
cruel oppression, and the chaotic reign of the short-lived Qin, both the 
ruler and the people longed for peace and prosperity, a desire that 
Taoism could meet.304 Chapter 57 of Tao De Jing captured the basic 
tenets of Taoism: 
The country must be based on the upright rules,  
Just like deploying troops with unconventional tactics.  
Those who refrain from assertive actions will win the world . . . . 
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The more prohibitions there are, the more destitute the people will be;  
The deadlier weapons the people possess, the more chaotic the world 
will be;  
The more trickery the people engage in, the more bizarre the society 
will be;  
The more laws there are, the more flourishing the robbers and thieves 
will become.   
Therefore, the sage says:  
I take no action, and the people transform themselves;  
I stay quiet, and the people correct themselves;  
I refrain from interfering with the people, and they improve themselves; 
I have no desires, and the people return to primitive simplicity.
305
  
Taoism is different from both Confucianism, which emphasized the 
leading role of the government to educate the people with virtues, and 
Legalism, which advocated for harsh punishments.306  A Taoist 
government should do nothing but let nature run its course.307  Any 
interference by the government would upset the balance of Tao, the rule 
of nature and thus hurt the people.  Taoism is a Chinese version of 
laissez-faire.308  
Taoism reached its peak during the first seventy years of the Han 
Dynasty.309  During this period, the Emperor made it his priority to 
abolish Qin’s harsh rules.310  This was exemplified in several ways. First, 
the Han government substantially reduced criminal penalties and made 
the law clear and understandable to ordinary people.311  During Qin’s 
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time, because there were too many laws backed by brutal punishments, 
the people often broke the laws unknowingly.312  The disproportional 
punishments aroused public anger and distrust.313  Therefore, it was 
necessary not only to simplify the laws but also reduce the 
punishments.314  For example, the Han government repealed collective 
penalties, penalties for slander, and cruel punishments, such as limb 
cutting, and various other cruel forms of the death penalty.315  
Additionally, the early Han government substantially reduced taxes for 
peasants.316  Moreover, the most importantly, the government 
emphasized that they would rather acquit a guilty person than convict an 
innocent one.317  If any doubt of guilt existed, a person would not be 
subject to the death penalty.318  
The Taoist approach helped the early Han overcome insurmountable 
challenges in the first seventy years of the empire.  The shattered 
economy recovered, the living standards improved, and the people 
enjoyed unprecedented peace and stability.319  The economic prosperity 
made the central government more self-assured and less dependent on 
local lords to maintain social order.320  However, the Emperor disliked 
the hands-off approach advocated by Taoists because it limited the 
central government’s ability to take control of the local affairs dominated 
by their native lords.321  In addition, the hands-off policy hampered the 
central government’s ability to collect taxes from local people.322 As a 
result, the new Han Emperor began doubting whether Taoism was the 
right ideology for the dynasty.323  Essentially, Taoism was probably 
better suited for a federal or confederal style government, but definitely 
not for the Han, which had the same ambition of building a centralized, 
top-down empire as that of Qin’s.  
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e. Confucianism as the Official Ideology  
During Emperor Wu of Han Han Wudi’s reign, Han abandoned 
Taoism and endorsed Confucianism as the official ideology.324  In 
addition, he eliminated other schools of thought.325  By this time, 
traditional Confucianism had evolved into an extremely wide-ranging 
ideology that borrowed heavily from the classics, including Legalism.326   
6. THE CORE VALUE OF CONFUCIANISM: INEQUALITY 
The notion of equality before the law never developed in traditional 
China.327  Confucianism claimed that men were endowed with different 
levels of intelligence and virtues.328  Therefore, the intelligent ones, “big 
men” or “gentlemen,” were better suited for mental work—to acquire 
virtues, gain knowledge, and govern other people.329  According to 
Confucius, those without intelligence were destined to do physical labor 
serving the ruling class.330  Mencius summed up the relationship between 
gentlemen and laborers as follows:  
Great men [gentlemen] have their proper business, and little men have 
their proper business . . .[s]ome who labor with their minds, and some 
labor with their strength.  Those who labor with their minds govern 
others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others.  
Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern 
others are supported by them.  This is a principle universally recognized.
 
331  
According to Confucianism, the foundation of good governance was 
Li, a hierarchical social order derived from family relationships.332  When 
the Duke of Qi asked Confucius to define a good government, he replied, 
“[Government excels] when the prince is prince, and the minister is 
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minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.”333  He meant that 
when each member of the population remained in one’s own position and 
faithfully carried out his or her assigned duties, then society was 
harmonious.334  
Xunzi (Hsuntze), a prominent Confucian, took the defense of 
inequality to a new level.  He argued that inequality in social status was 
the fundamental nature of the world.
 335  Unity and social harmony could 
only be achieved when people were unequal.336  The principle of 
inequality made the inferior willing to work for the superior.  Equality, 
however, would create confusion and cause chaos because it discouraged 
people from obeying orders while serving the superior.337  People of 
equal social status could not serve each other, obey each other’s orders, 
or provide each other resources.338  
Furthermore, Xunzi argued that if everyone desired the same thing, 
there would not be enough reserves left for the superior since the 
resources in the world were so limited.339  In the world of inequality, the 
inferior would learn to control their desires to ensure that the superior 
would have sufficient assets to live a life befitting of his high social 
status.340  If everyone equally pursued the same goods, there would not 
only be a shortage of supply but also a disorder that threatened social 
harmony.341  A world in disorder would then lead to poverty.342  Xunzi 
cited the sage’s saying to support his argument: “They are only uniform 
in that they are not uniform.”343  While Confucians generally disdained 
commerce and wealth, Xunzi was probably the first economics-minded 
defender of inequality.  
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7. THE CONFUCIANIZATION OF LAW344 
Since the core of Confucianism was inequality, the Confucian-
inspired laws offered the protection of inequality as the top priority to 
ensure that the royal family members, officials, and nobles were not 
subject to the same punishments prescribed in the criminal code as would 
a commoner.345  Throughout the imperial history, the differential 
treatment of the privileged and nobles remained the most important 
provision in the law codes until the last dynasty.346  
Article 7 of the Tang Code provided special treatment to eight 
categories of people who enjoyed higher social status than commoners 
because of royal connections either by blood or marriage, high virtue and 
learning, or distinguished service to the dynasty.347  The justification for 
the differential treatment came from the Rites of Zhou:
 348 “Punishments 
do not extend up to the great officers. If they commit offenses, they are 
judged under the eight deliberations, and the weight of the sentence is 
not governed by the books of punishment.”349  
Under Article 7, persons who were subject to special deliberations 
were:  
1. The relatives of the emperor: this category extends to the fifth 
degree of the Emperor’s blood relatives, as far as to the brothers of 
Emperor’s paternal great-great-grandfather and their descendants, as 
well as the Emperor’s paternal grandmother’s and his mother’s 
relatives up to the fifth-degree.
350
 
2. The old retainers of the Emperor: this category refers to those who 
have served the Emperor for a long period of time.  The Qing Code also 
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required that the servant had ready access to the Emperor and received 
the Emperor’s special favor.351  
3. Persons of high moral character: this includes those of great 
learning and virtue, also called worthy men or gentlemen. Their 
virtuous words and action set an example for the entire country to 
emulate.
352
 
4. Persons of great talent: this category includes military leaders, state 
counselors, and managers, whose exemplary deeds improve human 
relations.
353
 
5. Persons of great achievement and glory: this refers to decorated 
national heroes and strategists upon whom the Emperor depends to lead 
the army, build alliances, and maintain peace and prosperity in the 
country.
354
 
6. Persons of high position in the government: this category includes 
active duty official[s] of the third rank or above and nobilities of the 
first rank.
355
 
7. Persons of great diligence in their work: this category includes 
military and civil officials who served the country in remote areas 
under difficult circumstances. 
356
 
8. Guests of the state: this category includes the descendants of the  
proceeding dynasties who have been received as guests.
357
  
Closely following the Tang Code, the Qing Code prescribed 
privileges in Article 3, entitled: the “Eight [Categories of Persons Whose 
Cases are to be Especially] Considered.”358  The categories of persons 
who were entitled to special deliberation remained the same as provided 
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in Article 7 of the Tang Code, only with minor changes to the orders of 
the categories. 
[Article 3] is a provision whereby the nation treats with special favour 
relatives of the Emperor, the virtuous, the industrious, and those of long 
service, who must be treated outside the law, with forgiveness. 
Therefore, when they have committed offenses, the decision will be 
prepared and considered outside the normal provisions of the law. 
Thus, the persons entitled to have their cases especially considered will 
be made to be conscious of their dignity and not lightly to commit 
offenses.
359
  
a. Family Relations and Criminal Penalties   
Confucianist scholars in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasties 
(1644-1911) condensed the social relations to Five Relations and Three 
Bonds, which provided the ethical and legal grounds for the whole 
society.360  Five Relations: relationships between rulers and subject, 
father and son, husband and wife, younger and elder brothers, and friend 
and friend.361  The first three were called three bonds, which were the 
most important relationships for the family and society in ancient 
China.362  
Furthermore, the scholars developed mourning regulations based on 
family relations between a mourner and the deceased.363 There were five 
categories or grades of genealogical distance, each of which required 
distinctive clothing that a mourner must wear during the mourning 
period.364 The closer the genealogical distance the mourner was from the 
deceased, the more demonstrative the clothing would be and the longer 
the mourner was obligated to grieve.365 The impact of mourning 
regulations went far beyond conducting mourning rituals. In fact, the 
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regulations delineated the duties and obligations of living members 
among the family.366  
The mourning regulations served as a basis for the penal code to 
weigh criminal penalties in cases involving crimes committed against 
one’s relatives.367  When a senior committed a crime against a junior, the 
senior was entitled to leniency.368  Conversely, if a junior injured or 
killed a senior even without intent, the junior usually received severe 
penalties.369  The chart below illustrates how the judiciary board applied 
the mourning regulation in sentencing.  
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Mourning Regulations Implications on Criminal Penalty 
A son mourned his parents for 
three years.370 
If a son killed his father, even 
accidentally, the son would receive 
the most severe penalty.371  
Parents mourned their son for only 
one year.372  
If a father intentionally killed his 
son, the father would only receive 
60 blows and penal servitude for 
one year.373  
Parents mourned their unmarried 
daughter for one year.374  
If an unmarried daughter’s immoral 
conduct caused her father to 
commit suicide out of shame, the 
unmarried daughter would be 
sentenced to immediate death.375  
The parents mourned their married 
daughter for only nine months.376  
If a married daughter’s illicit sexual 
conduct caused her father to 
commit suicide out of shame, the 
married daughter received the death 
penalty with delay.377 
A wife mourned her husband’s 
death for three years.378  
If a wife intentionally killed her 
husband, she was to be sentenced to 
death by slicing. If a wife 
accidentally killed the husband, she 
was to be sentenced from three 
years of penal servitude, exile, to 
immediate strangulations.379  
A husband mourned his wife for 
only one year.380  
If a husband intentionally killed his 
wife, the husband was to be 
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Killing a parent was the most heinous crime which was punished by 
the most severe penalty.382  In such cases, the court did not differentiate 
between killing intentionally or by mistake.383  To show mercy, the 
Emperor occasionally considered extenuating circumstances, but he 
usually merely changed the sentence to a more humane form of 
execution.384  The law focused on the fact of a parent’s death, but not 
always on the reason for the death.    The following cases illustrate how 
offenders were punished under the Qing Codes.  
b. The Case of Jao (Mother Ordered Son to Purchase Poison for 
Her Suicide.) 385 
The case of Jao demonstrated how the principle of filial piety could 
place a junior member of the family in an impossible situation.386  After 
being harassed by a creditor, Mrs. Jao decided to commit suicide so that 
she could incriminate the creditor for her death.  To accomplish her plan, 
Jao ordered her son to buy poison.  For the son, if he resisted his 
mother’s order, he would commit the crime of impiety.  Following his 
mother’s order meant that he would assist in killing his mother, which 
was the most heinous crime.387  After failing to persuade Jao to give up 
her plan, the son bought the poison.  With the poison in his hand, the son 
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sentenced to strangulation after the 
assizes (meaning that it was 
possible for the sentence to be 
reduced.) If the husband 
accidentally killed his wife, there 
was no penalty.381  
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continued to advise her not to commit suicide.  But Jao snatched the 
poison, swallowed it, and died.388  
The provincial court applied the law of plotting to kill a parent by 
analogy and sentenced the son to death by slicing, the most severe form 
of the death penalty.389  In rejecting the sentence, the Board reasoned that 
the son did not have the intent to kill his mother.390  He had no choice but 
to obey his mother’s order to obtain the poison.391  For the authorities, 
however, the lack of intent was not enough to change the matricidal 
nature of the case.  With the approval of the Emperor, the Board reduced 
the provincial court’s sentence to death by immediate beheading, a less 
severe form of the death penalty.392  
c. The Case of Chen née Chang (Married Daughter’s Obligation 
to Her Parents) 393 
Mrs. Chen née Chang committed adultery with a man who later 
abducted her.394  Out of shame and indignation, Chen’s father committed 
suicide.395  The governor of Henan sentenced Chen to strangulation after 
assizes (death penalty with a delay for possible commutation) and 
referred the case to the Imperial Board in Beijing for review.396  There 
were two provisions of the Qing Code, which dealt with parents’ suicide 
caused by their offspring’s adultery: if an unmarried daughter’s illicit 
sexual relationship with a man caused her father to commit suicide out of 
shame and indignation, the unmarried daughter would face immediate 
strangulation (death penalty without delay).397  However, if a married 
daughter caused her father to commit suicide for the same reason, she 
would face a reduced sentence—strangulation after assizes (death 
penalty with delay, with a possibility of commutation).398 
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In this case, the governor reasoned that Chen’s marriage made her no 
longer a member of her parents’ family.399  Since the bond between Chen 
and her biological father weakened after the marriage, the legal penalties 
should also be changed accordingly.  Therefore, Chen should receive the 
death penalty with delay, rather than immediate death.  The Imperial 
Board affirmed the governor’s decision.400  Bodde and Morris offered 
additional support for the governor’s analysis.401 First, the mourning 
regulation required a married daughter to mourn her biological parent’s 
death for a much shorter period than it required an unmarried daughter to 
mourn.402  As a result, the married daughter should have “a lesser 
sentence for an offense committed against” her parents.403  Second, 
another provision of the Qing Code treated a married daughter and an 
unmarried one differently in treason cases.404  There, a married daughter 
of her father, who was guilty of treason, received no punishment even 
though the father’s family members, including all unmarried daughters, 
were subject to extermination, i.e., death or exile.405  It seems that the law 
was clear and consistent regarding the reduced legal obligation of 
married daughters to their biological parents.  
However, the Emperor overruled the Board’s affirmation of the 
governor’s decision by citing the Documents of Classic (Shu Jing), 
which was not in the Qing Code.406  The Emperor reasoned: “Because the 
child’s relationship to the parents derives from Heaven, no differentiation 
in that relationship should be made with respect to a daughter simply on 
the basis of whether or not she happens to be married.”407  The Board 
sentenced Chen to immediate strangulation according to the Emperor’s 
decision.408   
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d. The Case of Chen (Daughter-In-Law’s Obligation to Her 
Father-In-Law) 409 
Mrs. Chen did not respond to her father-in-law’s call for food because 
she was away from home washing clothes by the well.410  The father-in-
law was angry and attempted to beat her.  In the process, the father-in-
law fell to his death.411  The Provincial Court reasoned that Mrs. Chen 
did not intend to disobey her father-in-law and sentenced her to exile, 
one degree reduced from the death penalty.412  The Board affirmed the 
Court’s decision. When the Emperor received the case for the final 
review, however, he did not agree with the reduced sentence.413  He 
believed that Mrs. Chen violated filial piety by not heeding the 
patriarch’s call, and thus, she deserved the death penalty.414 Nonetheless, 
the Emperor reduced her sentence to exile on the grounds of compassion.  
Through this case, the Emperor tried to demonstrate that it was 
intolerable for any breach of filial piety, but it was in his discretion to 
avoid capital punishment to show mercy to his subjects.415  Mrs. Chen 
was spared not by her lack of intent, but by the Emperor’s benevolence.  
e. The Case of Hsing Hai (An Official’s Immunity After Killing 
His Son)416 
Hsing Hai was an official writer—a position he obtained by passing 
the civil service examination.417  One day, Hai learned that his son had 
misappropriated public funds for sacrificial services.  In addition, the son 
had beaten a service boy to death.418  During a private interrogation, Hai 
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beat his son to death.419  Without reporting the case to the government, he 
secretly buried his son’s body.420  
The provincial board of punishment asked the Imperial Board if Hai’s 
punishment could be reduced from eighty blows of the heavy bamboo to 
deprivation of official status or simple payment of a fine.  The 
commutation request was based on Article 8 of the Qing Code, which 
provided that government officials were entitled to special 
deliberations.421   
The punishment of eighty blows was not for Hai’s killing his son, but 
his failure to report the case to the authority.  In the absence of applicable 
provision from the code, the provincial board concluded that Hai’s 
killing of his son was justified because the son committed a capital 
crime.422  Therefore, the remaining issue for the provincial board was 
how to punish Hai for his failure to report the killing to the government.  
If a commoner committed the same crime, the board would have 
sentenced the commoner to eighty blows with heavy bamboo.  Since Hai 
was an official writer, he should receive special treatment under the law.  
The provincial board did not know how much leniency Hsing Hai 
deserved.423  
For the killing, the board contemplated two provisions of the Qing 
Code: (1) if a father killed his son for disobedience, the father received 
100 blows with heavy bamboo; or424 (2) if a father killed his child 
because the child has struck or reviled the father, the father was not 
guilty of the killing.425  However, the board was not ready to rely on 
either of the two provisions most likely due to lack of supporting 
evidence.426  So even without directly applicable law, the board ruled that 
Hsing Hai was justified in killing of his son.427  
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Reviewing the decision, the Imperial Board upheld the provincial 
board’s decision.428  On the issue of how his corporal punishment should 
be commuted, the Imperial Board reasoned: “[T]he father holds the 
position of official writer, and his penalty of 80 blows is not severe 
enough to call for removal from civil service, . . . he [shall] be permitted 
to pay a monetary redemption.”429  
f. A Sense of Proportionality  
Stealing objects from the Emperor’s ancestral temple was a serious 
crime punishable by the death penalty.430  Once, after catching a man for 
taking a jade ring from late Emperor Kao’s temple, the Commandant of 
Justice (called the Minister of Justice in later dynasties) sentenced him to 
public execution and referred the case to Emperor Wen for final 
approval.431  The Emperor was so furious about the man’s act of 
desecration that he asked the Commandant to exterminate (i.e., to kill) 
the man’s entire family.432  Surprisingly, the Commandant declined to 
follow the Emperor’s recommendation, reasoning that the punishment 
should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime.  In this case, it 
was sufficient to punish the man by public execution.  The Commandant 
further explained: “If for stealing objects from the ancestral temples 
[y]ou would exterminate [the man’s family], how would [y]ou apply this 
law . . .  in the extraordinary and suppositious case that somebody [dug 
up the late Emperor’s coffin]?”433  The Commandant’s salient analysis 
recorded in 160 B.C. would certainly delight Judge Posner.  In his well-
known article An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, Judge Posner had 
almost the same thought:  
If robbery is punished as severely as murder, the robber might as well 
kill his victim to eliminate a witness.  Thus, one cost of making the 
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punishment of a crime more severe is that it reduces the criminal’s 
incentive to substitute that crime for a more serious one.
434
  
The record did not show whether the Emperor took the 
Commandant’s advice.  If the Emperor was as economics-minded as 
Judge Posner, he should have forgiven the Commandant who spoke 
against him.435  The Commandant’s fate hinged on the Emperor’s 
intelligence, education, and experience.  So did the entire nation of China 
for two millennia, because no one was allowed to be wiser than the 
Emperor.  
8. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
In ancient China, there was no division of power.436  At the central 
level, the Judiciary Board was one of the six ministries under the 
Emperor.437  The Board officials were civil servants who passed the 
national exams on the Chinese classics—of which law was unlikely a 
subject.438  Career clerks at the Judicial Board assisted the officials in 
trying and reviewing cases.439  Beneath the central government was three 
levels of governments in ascending order: the district (or the county), the 
prefecture, and the provincial governments.440  Magistrates at the district, 
county, and prefecture levels personally handled legal cases.441  Except 
for minor cases punishable by bambooing, the magistrates had no power 
to try cases.442 At the provincial level, the judiciary commission—which 
was separate but not independent of other departments—handled legal 
cases.443  The provincial governor made the final decisions on these 
cases.444  Magistrates were responsible for investigating and transferring 
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cases to higher levels of government.445    The provincial judicial 
commission was responsible for trying capital cases and other cases 
punishable by exile or penal servitude.446  All death penalty cases were to 
be sent to the Emperor for final review and approval.447  
a. Lawyers as Litigation Tricksters  
As a profession, lawyers rarely existed throughout ancient Chinese 
history.448  In China’s top-down political structure, the government 
viewed any legal representation “as a dangerous source of trouble,”449 
which eroded the governor’s sole power to administer justice.450  While 
the government occasionally permitted legal representation of one’s 
relatives in rural areas, it generally regarded lawyers as “troublemakers 
and corruptors.”451  Therefore, the Qing Code permitted legal 
representation under limited circumstances:   
1. A lawyer could represent his close relative or in a case in which the 
lawyer had a legitimate personal interest.   
2. In ancient China, the extremely low rate of literacy made it 
impossible for people in rural areas to access justice.  Therefore, the 
code permitted a lawyer to prepare legal documents for illiterate people 
if the lawyer did not attempt to fabricate causes of action. 
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3. If “a habitual litigation trickster[ ] who conspire[d] with 
government clerks, trick[ed] ignorant country folk, or practice[d] 
intimidation or fraud[,]” the trickster was to be punished “by military 
exile at the most distant malarial regions of Yunnan or Kueichow.”452 
In practice, however, the governor had various ways to penalize 
lawyers without relying on any code provision.  In a Henan case, Hsia 
Fang-chueh petitioned the governor to apprehend the murderer of his 
clansman, who was beyond five degrees of mourning.453  Hsia took two 
ounces of silver for the legal work from the clansman’s family.454 The 
governor held that Hsia was guilty of the illegal practice of law because 
he was not legally related to the clansman.455  To be related, the clansman 
had to be within five degrees of mourning, i.e., Hsia’s third cousin or 
closer.456  
Technically, Hsia could have argued that the clansman’s family 
members were illiterate, and the law did not prohibit a lawyer from 
receiving legal fees.
 457   
In sentencing, the governor did not find a code provision directly 
applicable for Hsia’s crime.  By analogy, the governor referenced a 
provision regarding habitual litigation tricksters: whoever “conspired 
with [a] government clerk[ ] trick[ ] ignorant country folk, or practice 
intimidation or fraud[,]” was to be sentenced to military exile to a remote 
region.458  The governor sentenced Hsia to three years of penal servitude, 
one degree less than the punishment for habitual litigation tricksters.459  
Why did the governor mitigate the punishment from military exile to a 
three-year servitude?  Is it because the governor wanted to show 
benevolence?  Or is it because he was unsure of the legality of the 
judgment?  Or both?  It would take another litigation trickster to find out.    
To prevent legal representation, a provincial government issued an 
edict warning local magistrates of vicious law practices by tricksters:
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[The litigation tricksters] entrap people for the sake of profit.  They 
fabricate empty words and heap up false charges.  At their bidding, 
plaintiffs are induced to bring up stupid nonsense in their accusations 
whose empty falsity, when exposed at the trial, brings blame upon the 
plaintiffs themselves while the litigation tricksters stand to one side.  
Victims of these false accusations, once they have been dragged in, 
remain entrapped and their livelihood is gone.  Even should they have 
the luck to be completely exonerated as a result of the trial, their 
families will by then have become ruined . . . . All these devilish doings 
certainly deserve our bitter detestation.
 460
  
The edict required the magistrates to question the petitioners whether 
tricksters had instigated, advised, and published their petitions.461 Once 
confirmed, the magistrates must immediately arrest the tricksters.462 The 
edict also requested magistrates to compare the complaints with the 
petitioner’s own handwriting.463  If the handwriting didn’t match, the 
magistrate must compel the petitioner to reveal the trickster’s name and 
apprehend the trickster.464  The magistrate must strictly investigate and 
punish the trickster and treat the bona fide petitioner with leniency.465  
b. Death Penalty  
In 631, the Emperor of T’ang Dynasty ordered the execution of a high 
official for his defense of an insane man who uttered improper 
remarks.466 Deeply regretting his order, the Emperor exclaimed: “Human 
life is of the utmost importance, for once dead, a man cannot live 
again.”467  From then on, the Emperor mandated that all decisions 
concerning the death penalty be reported two days in advance to the 
Emperor for a final review and that no death penalty be carried out 
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without the Emperor’s approval.468  Emperors in the subsequent dynasties 
followed the same practice.  
However, the review process, which took place in autumn, “was 
complex and over[-]refined; perhaps it was unduly ritualized.”469 The 
Board presented the Emperor with two lists of names.470  The first list 
carried the names of criminals to be executed and the second list 
provided the names of those who deserved commutation.471  The Board 
wrote the first list of names on a large piece of paper with the names of 
those deemed to be less guilty than others “placed either at the corners or 
in the [center].”472  Then, the Board submitted the first list to the Emperor 
for review.473  The Emperor, “with a brush dipped in vermilion, [made] a 
circle on it at seeming, and to some extent real, hazard, and criminals 
whose names [were] traversed by the red line [were] ordered for 
execution.”474  Those who luckily dodged the Emperor’s red circle would 
survive for another year until the next review ensued.475 
9. CONCLUSION: THE APPLE DOESN’T FALL FAR FROM THE TREE.476 
Through his ingenuity and hard work, Confucius transformed and 
perfected an institution for governing Chinese people, which has been 
religiously replicated since 50 B.C. Confucius conjured a utopia and 
prescribed a path to achieve it: when people restrained themselves and 
act upon the rule of propriety, the world was in the proper order just as 
experienced in the early Zhou dynasty. According to that order, the King, 
at the pinnacle of the pyramid, held absolute authority; regional lords 
were loyal to the King; and commoners were submissive to the 
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privileged. If people acted according to their hierarchical worth assigned 
by the authority, there would be peace and order.   
Inequality is the core of Confucianism. Confucians claimed that men 
were endowed with different levels of intelligence and virtues. 
Therefore, the intelligent “gentlemen” were suited for governing those 
without intelligence, who were destined to do physical labor serving the 
ruling class. The central theme of the Confucian-inspired laws was the 
perpetuation of inequality. According to Rites of Zhou, “[p]unishments 
do not extend up to the great officers.”477 Throughout the imperial 
history, the differential treatment of the privileged and nobles remained 
the first provision in the legal codes.  
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has had a love-hate 
relationship with Confucius. Initially, Mao Zedong viewed Confucius as 
a threat to Communism, and thus his followers burned Confucius’s 
books and desecrated his tomb. However, it proved impossible to uproot 
the Confucian traditions that had been deeply ingrained in people’s 
minds and souls. Mao’s anti-Confucius detour was only a brief hiatus in 
a two-thousand-year-old tradition. With the declining influence of 
Communism, President Xi has revived the Confucian tradition to 
maintain the CPC’s legitimacy. Under the banner of “building a Chinese 
dream of national rejuvenation,” China has established Confucius 
Institutes throughout the world promoting Chinese values abroad and 
rekindle nationalism at home. Confucius’s spirit lives on. Unless the 
power is decentralized and the Confucian hierarchy is rejected, the rule 
of law will unlikely take root in China.  
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